JEL Classifications: (D1) Household Behavior and Family Economics (I38) Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs WELFARE PAYMENTS AND THE SPREAD OF AIDS IN THE UNITED STATES by W. Ressler et al.
 
 
 
 
 
JEL Classifications: (D1) Household Behavior and Family Economics 
(I38) Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WELFARE PAYMENTS AND THE SPREAD OF AIDS IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rand W. Ressler, Melissa S. Waters,  
John Keith Watson, R. Carter Hill 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Address for Ressler and Watson: 
Department of Economics and Finance 
University of Louisiana at Lafayette 
Lafayette, LA  70504-4570 
Phone (337) 482-6662 
Fax:  (337) 482-6675 
e-mail (Ressler): rwr5011@louisiana.edu  
 
Address for Waters: 
Department of Economics 
Southern University 
Baton Rouge, LA  70813 
 
Address for Hill: 
Department of Economics 
Louisiana State University 
Baton Rouge, LA  70803   
 
 
 
  
WELFARE PAYMENTS AND THE SPREAD OF AIDS IN THE UNITED STATES   
 
Rand W. Ressler, Melissa S. Waters,  
John Keith Watson, R. Carter Hill 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
  The history of the HIV/AIDS epidemic began 20 years ago in the United 
States when the first reports of a previously unrecognized illness were 
reported to the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in 
Atlanta.  These cases involved Pneumocystis Pneumonia and Kaposi’s sarcoma 
among male homosexuals in Los Angeles and New York.  In the succeeding years, 
the face of the American HIV epidemic has changed from one primarily involving 
whites, to one in which the majority of those infected are members of nonwhite 
minority groups.  From an epidemic whose original victims were male 
homosexuals or intravenous drug users, the mode of transmission of the HIV 
virus has expanded to a much broader base.  Heterosexual transmission, 
particularly affecting females, now plays a much larger role. 
  Between 1981 and 2001 in the United States, 793,026 AIDS cases were 
reported to the CDC.  During this time, the deaths of 457,667 men, women, and 
children were caused by AIDS.
1 Approximately 40,000 new HIV cases occur each 
year in the United States, and roughly 30% of these are now women. The CDC 
estimates that 75% of these newly infected women contracted HIV through 
heterosexual contact. Worldwide, 40 million people are estimated to be living 
with HIV or AIDS, and during 2001 alone, an estimated 3 million people died of 
AIDS. Approximately 48% of adults living with HIV or AIDS worldwide are women. 
  As an example of the changing face of AIDS in the United States, from 
the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s, the number of women with AIDS increased from 
8% to 21% (67% of these cases were from heterosexual transmission); the 
proportion of whites dropped from 60% to 43%; cases among homosexuals and 
bisexuals dropped from 64% to 44%; and the proportion of cases attributed to 
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 heterosexual transmission increased from 3% to 13%.  
 
  Currently in the U.S., blacks make up about 38% of all reported AIDS 
cases.  Almost two-thirds of all women with AIDS are black.  As of 2000, the 
rate of reported AIDS cases among black Americans was twice the rate for 
Hispanics and 8 times the rate for whites.  In the U.S., AIDS has become 
increasingly a disease of poor Americans.  The changing pattern of HIV/AIDS 
infections may be attributed in some small part to government policy.    
  Economists believe, and often demonstrate, that incentives matter.  In 
particular, economic incentives affect individual behavior in predictable 
ways.  This belief extends to all human behavior from the decisions on 
corporate mergers to the decisions on sexual activities.
2  The decision to 
engage in various activities, including sexual activities, is based on 
expected benefits and expected costs which may be altered through public 
policy.  Economists have studied many issues involving the effects of public 
income transfers and the incentives that they create.  A frequently studied 
topic is the effect of welfare payments on various aspects of behavior, such 
as labor market participation and fertility.  Some studies have found a 
positive relationship between welfare payments and illegitimate fertility 
rates. Increases in the relative size of these welfare payments (in 
particular, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, or AFDC) decrease the 
expected cost of illegitimate children and thereby lower the price, or 
expected cost, of premarital and unprotected sex. 
  In this paper, we extend the above argument and take the analysis one 
step further.  If AFDC payments lower the expected costs of unprotected sex, 
then states with higher AFDC payments should experience higher rates of 
heterosexual HIV and AIDS cases, other things equal.  Using state-wide data 
over the years 1993 through 1996, we hypothesize a positive relationship 
between the size of welfare payments per recipient and the heterosexual HIV 
infection rate.   
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Section II contains a brief review of the economic literature  
surrounding welfare payments and illegitimate fertility rates.  Only a few 
economic studies examine any issues involving AIDS, and none addresses the 
relationship between heterosexual HIV or AIDS rates and the economic 
incentives provided by welfare payments.  Section III describes 
epidemiological and data issues.  Section IV contains a description of the 
model, and Section V the econometric methodology and empirical results.  
Finally, Section VI provides a brief summary and conclusion.  
 
 
II.  The Literature 
  The impact of economic incentives on the decision to have sex and, 
therefore, children, has been addressed in the literature for hundreds of 
years.  As summarized by Clarke and Strauss (1998), Malthus (1798), Blaug 
(1978), and, more recently, Becker (1991) have all taken an economic approach 
to explaining people's desire to have children.  The early economists viewed 
children as investment goods, i.e., they were income-producing assets. 
However, contemporary economists most often view children as consumption goods 
providing utility directly to the parents. 
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  Clarke and Strauss combine these views of children to provide a 
comprehensive study of the effects of welfare payments (AFDC, and food 
stamps), on the rate of illegitimate births to teenagers.  They suggest that 
among low-income individuals, children are viewed not only as consumption 
goods, but also as a source of income from welfare payments.  By modeling a 
woman's utility as a function of children, consumption, family income, and 
leisure, they find that AFDC payments and other forms of welfare have 
contributed to the rapid increase in the rate of illegitimate births since the 
end of World War II.  Other researchers have found similar results (Caudill 
and Mixon, 1993). Not all economic studies, however, support the positive 
relation between AFDC payments and illegitimate births, (see Moffitt, 1992, 
and Murry, 1993, for summaries).    
  The responsibility for AFDC payments was shared by both federal and 
state governments.  The federal government imposed broad guidelines for the 
implementation of the program, while states determined the level of benefits 
and administered the program.  The level of benefits in each state was 
determined by that state’s standard level of need along with the recipients' 
level of income.  Consequently, payments varied greatly from state to state.  
For example, in 1994 the average monthly payment per recipient in Mississippi 
was $42.91 while in Alaska it was $246.78.  The average of all states in 1994 
was $133.55. 
Whether or not increases in AFDC payments actually increase the number 
of illegitimate births is not as important to this study as is the fact that 
the existence of AFDC payments lowers the expected costs of unprotected sex 
for men and women within the target group of welfare recipients. This target 
group consists largely of low income, poorly educated, disadvantaged unwed 
teenage girls and women. Many will note that providing economic security to 
low income females should have the opposite effect on fertility than what we 
propose: they argue that fertility should decrease as women become more 
empowered.  We certainly agree that the long-term effects of a successful 
poverty reduction program will be to empower women through increases in 
education and income levels, and thus may reduce fertility rates.  Our 
contention, with which there is little argument, is that the AFDC program was 
not a success in eliminating or even largely reducing core poverty rates, in 
part because its incentive structure was adverse.  The Welfare Reform Law of 
1996 essentially ended the federal entitlement to assistance.  Effective July 
1, 1997, AFDC was replaced by the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) program, which placed emphasis on individual state policies designed to 
promote work, responsibility and self-sufficiency in exchange for time-limited 
assistance. 
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III. Epidemiological Issues and Data Limitations  
  AIDS stands for acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, and describes a 
collection of so-called "AIDS indicator illnesses" as defined by the CDC. 
AIDS is caused by the human immunodeficiency virus, or HIV.  HIV is spread 
through contact with bodily fluids such as blood, semen, vaginal fluid, breast 
milk, and other bodily fluids containing blood.  The HIV virus damages the 
immune system over time, eventually allowing an AIDS indicator illness to 
develop, at which time the HIV-positive individual is diagnosed with AIDS.  
  The time lag, or incubation period, between HIV contraction and AIDS 
diagnosis can vary widely.  Though the median incubation period from HIV 
infection until development of AIDS is approximately 10 years for young 
adults, substantial variation is reported across patients (Bacchetti and Moss, 
1989).  The incubation period can be as short as one year, and has an upper 
limit which is still unknown and has currently reached at least 20 years. The 
incubation period also varies based on age at contraction, and is shorter in 
both infants and older adults (Rosenberg, et al., 1994).  Since AIDS was 
recognized as a new clinical syndrome in 1981, medical advances have increased 
the incubation period for many HIV infected individuals (and decreased the 
death rate for AIDS diagnosed individuals). 
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  Due to the incubation period from HIV to AIDS, a contemporaneous model 
linking welfare payments to AIDS contraction is not appropriate.  A lagged 
model is not tenable, either, due to the wide variation in incubation periods 
among individuals (as well as changes in the median incubation period over 
time.)  The use of HIV incidence as the dependent variable is clearly 
indicated.  Further, we are interested in the transfer of HIV through 
heterosexual contact, which limits our data sources. While all 50 states and 
the District of Columbia report AIDS cases to the CDC, not all report new 
cases of HIV infection.
3  Among those states reporting HIV cases, there is a 
great deal of variation in the accompanying reporting of demographic and risk 
information. Unfortunately, published data on state-wide HIV incidence by 
exposure category (e.g., through heterosexual contact, homosexual contact, receipt of blood transfusion, injecting drug use, etc.) are not available.   
 
  A limited amount of AIDS data has been published which indicates 
exposure category, or transmission mechanism, by state (only national data are 
readily available for both AIDS and HIV cases by exposure category).  These 
data, the proportion of a state's total AIDS cases generated from heterosexual 
contact, have been published for the years 1993-1996.  This dictates the size 
of our state-based data set. 
  In an attempt to roughly estimate the state-wide proportion of HIV cases 
caused by heterosexual contact, we extrapolate from the published 1993-1996 
heterosexual AIDS data.  Our dependent variable is an estimated heterosexual 
HIV rate per state: the proportion of a state's new HIV infections is 
multiplied by the proportion of its new AIDS cases caused by heterosexual 
contact for each year. (For example, if 5 percent of a state’s newly reported 
AIDS cases are the result of heterosexual contact, we assume this same 
percentage also applies to the state’s new HIV cases.)  For our available time 
frame, 26 states consistently reported new HIV cases.  These states are listed 
in Table 2.  
 
IV. Model Specification 
  We specify the following model using data on the 26 reporting states for 
1993-1996: 
HET-HIV Rate = f(AFDC, COLLEGE, IMPOP, DOCTORS, NOINSURE, AGE, 
      BLACK, HEALTHEX YEAR94, YEAR95, YEAR96, REGIONi)     (1) 
 
Where: 
•  HET-HIV Rate is the number of new HIV cases multiplied by the proportion 
of all new AIDS cases which are caused by heterosexual contact, for each 
state, 
•  AFDC is the amount of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
payment, per recipient,
4
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 •  COLLEGE is the percentage of population with at least four years of 
college, 
 
•  IMPOP is the number of immigrants admitted per resident population, 
•  DOCTORS is the number of practicing doctors per 100,000 population, 
•  NOINSURE is the percentage of the population without health insurance, 
•  AGE is the percentage of the population aged 18-34, 
•  BLACK is the percentage of the population who are African-American, 
•  HEALTHEX is government spending on health care and hospitals per capita, 
•  YEAR94, YEAR95, and YEAR96 are dummy variables indicating year(1993 is 
the base year), 
•  REGIONi is a vector of regional dummy variables,
5 
  The explanatory variable in which we are most interested is AFDC.  As 
argued above, if higher AFDC payments lead to higher rates of fertility, it 
should also be the case that the sexual conduct required for pregnancy will 
put participants at risk for contracting HIV.  Thus, in states with generous 
AFDC payments, single women will face lower costs of bearing and raising 
children and will be less likely to actively seek to prevent pregnancy. Our 
primary hypothesis is of a direct relationship between the magnitude of AFDC 
payments per recipient and new HIV cases caused by heterosexual contact. 
  Among the factors influencing fertility are labor market participation 
and opportunities, and earnings, all interrelated variables.  COLLEGE is 
included to represent more highly educated and higher wage-earning women.  
Greater education may imply greater knowledge of the risks of transmitting 
disease through unprotected sex; in addition, higher-wage women have higher 
opportunity costs of childbearing and rearing.  Thus, COLLEGE is expected to 
have a negative impact on the contraction rate of the HIV virus. 
  Historically, HIV was brought to the United States through international 
travel of Americans, and through immigration.  Immigration has long been 
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associated with the spread of diseases, and it is unrealistic to think that 
HIV would differ from this pattern.  In addition to this precedent, it may be 
the case that in many countries, particularly Developing Countries, 
individuals do not have access to the same level of health care that many 
enjoy in the U.S.  These arguments must be tempered, however, with the 
knowledge that not all immigrants are from poor countries, nor are they all 
from low income backgrounds. We cautiously expect that the coefficient of 
IMPOP will be positive. 
  If the number of doctors in a state is an indication of access to health 
care, we anticipate a negative correlation between DOCTORS and the number of 
HIV/AIDS cases reported from all contact categories.  However, it is more 
likely that the number of doctors is an indicator of availability to which 
many low-income individuals may not have practical access.  On the other hand, 
a positive correlation may exist if HIV/AIDS infected individuals migrate to 
states with more doctors and better health care facilities. DOCTORS may not be 
exogenous, however, if doctors themselves migrate to states where a strong 
market for their services exists, perhaps due in part to greater HIV/AIDS 
prevalence. To control for this possibility, we test for the exogeneity of 
DOCTORS as discussed in the following section. 
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  Individuals without health insurance may delay childbearing because of 
financial constraints.  One might expect that at the margin, an increase in 
the (potential) cost of any activity - even unprotected sex - would act as a 
deterrent of sorts.  If so, the coefficient of NOINSURE would be negative.  
However, neither women who currently receive welfare, nor many low income 
women who view AFDC payments as a viable future option, are likely to have 
private health insurance benefits.  Among this group of individuals, a lack of 
private health care coverage may have little or no influence on fertility 
decisions.  If true, NOINSURE may not significantly affect exposure to HIV.  
As a result, we have no strong a priori expectation on the sign attached to 
NOINSURE.    
  AGE represents the percent of the population aged 18-34.  These are 
years in which fertility tends to be highest.  Fertility rates also tend to 
be relatively high at the lower end of this range for low income females and 
minorities.  In addition, young adults are more likely to be single and have 
multiple partners.  For these reasons, we expect AGE to be positively 
associated with HET-HIV. 
  It has been well documented that the African American community has been 
particularly hard hit by the AIDS epidemic. African Americans account for 38% 
of all AIDS cases, while comprising only 11% of the population.  Through the 
middle of 1996, African American women accounted for 55% of all female AIDS 
cases.  Among intravenous drug users with AIDS, African Americans accounted 
for greater than 50% of cases.  Almost 60% of all children with AIDS were 
African American.   
  We suspect the disproportionately large effect of AIDS on African 
Americans can be explained primarily by differences in socio-economic status, 
as characterized by education and income levels, and health care access. To 
account for unobservable and/or cultural characteristics which may play an 
additional role, we include BLACK and expect it to have a positive 
coefficient.  
  Government spending on health care is expected to lower the contraction 
rates of HIV/AIDS.  This is primarily due to the educational and prevention 
efforts put
 forth by the government-subsidized health care community. As with 
DOCTORS, however, one might expect HEALTHEX to be endogenous in the model if 
areas with greater HIV/AIDS prevalence receive more health care funds as a 
result.  Again, we test for the exogeneity of HEALTHEX as discussed in the 
following section.   
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  Throughout much of the 1990s, annual rates of newly reported AIDS cases 
in the United States have steadily declined.  During this time period, 
however, the CDC estimates that the annual number of new HIV infections has 
remained roughly stable. Annual dummy variables are included to test for  
, T K
structural shifts which may have occurred in heterosexual HIV rates over 
time, and which are not otherwise accounted for by the continuous explanatory 
variables. It is well documented that in the HIV/AIDS epidemic, women are 
increasingly affected, and that heterosexual transmission plays an increasing 
role.  However, the limitations of HIV surveillance and thus available HIV 
data make hypotheses regarding the annual dummy variables tenuous at best. 
Accordingly, with 1993 as the base year, we have no firm a priori expectations 
on the signs of the coefficients on YEAR94, YEAR95, and YEAR96. 
  In addition to the included variables, cultural norms which are 
characteristic of a particular region may contribute to the variation in the 
AIDS rate across the United States.  Among these are religious attitudes and 
affiliation, political allegiance, and social mores reflecting tolerance and 
diversity, for example.  These norms, or patterns of behavior characteristic 
of a particular group, are unobservable variables.  Proxy variables must be 
used, whether measured directly (by an ordinal scale reflecting tolerance of 
alternative sexual lifestyles), or indirectly (by the number of needle-
exchange programs, or state or regional dummy variables).  We use 8 regional 
dummy variables to capture immeasurable and/or unobservable cultural 
differences across regions. The New England region is the base category, and 
we do not have strong expectations about the sign or significance of these 
coefficient estimates.   
 
V. Econometric Methodology and Empirical Results 
 
The data used in this paper are a cross-section of N=26 states observed 
over a period of T=4 years. Using standard notation let: 
   (2)  11 ,, ;, it it it it yxYe i Nt ′′ =β + γ + = = K
The scalar   is the value of the dependent variable (HET-HIV Rate) for state 
i at time period t. The vector 
it y
it x′  is a ( ) 1 k ×  vector of previously defined 
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)
exogenous variables (the eight regional dummies; YEAR94, YEAR95, YEAR96; and 
the continuous variables AFDC, AGE, COLLEGE, IMPOP, NOINSURE and BLACK) with 
parameter vector β. The   vector Y ( 1 m × it ′  contains the two possibly endogenous 
variables, DOCTORS and HEALTHEX, with parameter vector  γ . The error term e  
is assumed to have 0 mean and variance  .  
it
2 1 ,, , i iN σ= K
( ) 1 g × it ′
Ye γ+
it x′
In order to test for the possibility that the variables DOCTORS and 
HEALTHEX are endogenous, we use the regression based "Hausman Test" described 
in Wooldridge (2002, Chapter 6.2.1). First, however, we must estimate their 
reduced forms.  To do so, we specified a   vector z  of instrumental 
variables that are not included in  it x′ . The instruments used are: percentage 
of the population living in metropolitan areas; personal income per capita; 
average wage of 18 to 34 year olds; and two measures of religious affiliation, 
percent Catholic and percent Jewish.  The latter two are included as rough 
proxies for state-wide cultural differences influencing health care demand and 
quality. In vector and matrix notation the model is 
  yX = β+  (3) 
  Before implementing the Hausman test, we wished to determine how good 
our specified instruments actually are.  Accordingly, we tested the quality of 
our instruments for DOCTORS and HEALTHEX in two different ways.  First, we 
tested whether the instruments provide useful information about DOCTORS and 
HEALTHEX.  In order to be useful, they must provide information in addition to 
that provided by the exogenous explanatory variables in the model, the  it x′ . 
Following the suggestion of Wooldridge (2002, p.92) we estimated auxiliary 
regressions with dependent variables DOCTORS and HEALTHEX, respectively, and 
right-hand-side variables   and zit ′ . We then test the joint significance of 
the coefficients in z .  For both regressions, we reject the null hypothesis 
that the coefficients are zero at the .01 level of significance.  We thus 
it ′
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Z
conclude that our instruments do help explain the potentially endogenous 
variables, DOCTORS and HEALTHEX.   
As a test of instrument validity, note that we have g = 5 instrumental 
variables when only m = 2 are required, resulting in g - m = 3 over-
identifying restrictions.  We tested for the validity of the instruments in 
the sense that they are not correlated with the error term, using a regression 
based test again described in Wooldridge (2002, chapter 6.6.2).
6
   
Essentially, we are testing whether the over-identifying instruments are 
uncorrelated with the regression error e.  The value of the Chi-square test 
statistic is 3.92 with a p-value of 0.27.  Thus, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of no correlation, and conclude that our instruments are 
satisfactory.   
Having made this conclusion, we implemented the Hausman Test to 
determine whether DOCTORS and HEALTHEX should be treated as exogenous or 
endogenous.
7 This test has as its null hypothesis that the variables in Y 
(DOCTORS and HEALTHEX) are uncorrelated with the error term e.  If we reject 
this hypothesis then we conclude that Y is endogenous and that we should apply 
Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimation.  If we fail to reject the 
hypothesis then we are justified in using a simple least squares or 
generalized least squares procedure. In our case, the Wald test statistic 
value is 8.0572934, wit a p-value of 0.0177984. Thus, we reject the null 
hypothesis at the .05 level of significance, and conclude that DOCTORS and 
HEALTHEX are endogenous, and that 2SLS is an appropriate estimator.    
We used a 2SLS estimation procedure that accounts for the cross-
sectional heteroskedasticity in the error vector e.  We first estimated the 
model in (3) by 2SLS, using the full set of instruments WX | = , obtaining 
the 2SLS residuals e .  We obtained estimates of the error variances 
, using the consistent estimator 
ˆ
2 1 ,, , i i σ= K N
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22
1
1 ˆ ˆ ,,
T
ii t
t
eT i N
=
σ= = ∑ K, . (4)   
We then divide through both sides of equation (2) by ˆi σ  to yield the weighted 
regression 
 
 
ˆˆ ˆ
it it it it
ii i
yx Y e
ˆ i
′ ′
=β + γ +
σσ σ σ
 (5) 
Now, for example, applying OLS to this transformed equation yields the 
feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimator. Similarly, applying 2SLS 
to (5), with the instruments similarly weighted, yields “weighted” 2SLS.  
Henceforth we assume that our data have been transformed in this way.
8
 
   The 2SLS results are contained in Table 3.  Tables 1 and 2 provide 
various descriptive statistics on AIDS, HIV, and welfare payments for the 
years of analysis.   
  The positive and statistically significant coefficient on AFDC confirms 
our primary hypothesis.  States with higher AFDC payments are associated with 
higher mean heterosexually transmitted HIV rates.  This supports the economic 
theory that children may be viewed as income-producing assets among low-income 
individuals.  By lowering the costs of unprotected sex and thus increasing its 
incidence, the individuals involved are at greater risk of contracting the HIV 
virus, which leads to AIDS. 
  Of the remaining continuous variables, COLLEGE, IMPOP, BLACK, DOCTORS, 
and HEALTHEX are all statistically significant and have the anticipated sign. 
The positive coefficient on DOCTORS is consistent with a migration of doctors 
to areas with a high demand for health care, and does not support a link 
between availability of and access to health care, at least for low income 
individuals.  The significance of the estimated coefficient on BLACK is 
particularly high, and is consistent with the well-known demographic pattern 
of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the United States.  As was cautiously anticipated, 
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 states with a higher percentage of immigrants are associated with higher 
rates of heterosexually transmitted HIV.   
 
  From a public policy perspective, the significance of HEALTHEX is 
intriguing.  The results indicate that states with more government provided 
health care have significantly lower contraction rates of heterosexually 
transmitted HIV.  Educational efforts regarding HIV and “safe sex” may be 
included in the variable HEALTHEX.  The effectiveness of government spending 
in reducing contraction rates presents an interesting cost-benefits question, 
which should be pursued in future research. 
  Of the three included year dummies, only the coefficient on 1994 is 
significant, and it is positive.  This implies that between 1993 and 1994, a 
positive structural shift in the heterosexual HIV rate model occurred.  No 
such shift occurred in 1995 or 1996, however. It should be emphasized that 
these results are generated from our nonrandom sample of 26 reporting states. 
In this sample, mean estimated heterosexual HIV rates increased substantially 
from 1993 to 1994, then declined in each of the following two years, although 
remaining higher than the mean 1993 rate. Obviously, all inferences are 
confined to this 26 state sample.   
  Each of the seven included geographical dummy variables is significant 
and positive.  Holding constant all other included explanatory variables, all 
geographic regions have higher rates of per capita estimated heterosexual HIV 
cases than New England. This may reflect unobservable cultural differences 
across regions contributing to variations in HIV incidence, as well as 
variations in HIV reporting procedures across states. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
  Some studies have established that AFDC payments are 
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positively related to rates of fertility and illegitimacy.  This paper 
presents the next logical step by recognizing that an increase in fertility 
must be accompanied by an increase in unprotected sex.  Thus, AFDC payments  
serve to lower the costs (or potential costs) of engaging in unprotected 
sexual relations, a consequence of which is a greater risk of contracting HIV 
and AIDS. Using statewide data for the 26 reporting states from 1993 through 
1996, our expectations appear confirmed: The size of the per recipient AFDC 
payment positively influences the heterosexual HIV rate. 
  This result may prove to be provocative as policy makers continue to 
debate issues of welfare reform and propose changes in the Welfare Reform Law 
of 1996, which expires in late 2002. It appears that neither politicians nor 
economists have yet succeeded in bringing relief to the socially disadvantaged 
without creating undesirable incentives.  The limitations of the data 
available for this analysis restrict general inferences.  However, these 
results represent a useful starting point from which it is hoped additional 
economic research will be generated.  Comparisons between the effects of the 
AFDC program and the TANF program could prove particularly illuminating from a 
policy perspective.  With additional research, a decisive determination may be 
made concerning the link between public assistance and the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
in the United States. 
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TABLE 1   
 
 
Descriptive Statistics for AIDS, Heterosexual AIDS, AFDC per recipient:1993-
1996 for all 50 States and the District of Columbia 
 
_________________________________________________________________    
  
    Mean   Standard 
      Deviation  
  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Heterosexual AIDS* 179.31 336.96   
    (1993) 
    159.86 309.34   
    (1994) 
    160.29 286.69   
    (1995) 
    161.96 282.35   
    (1996) 
 
 
 
All AIDS    2027.5 3741.9   
    (1993)  
    1532.9 2896.9   
    (1994) 
    1415.1 2535.3      
    (1995) 
    1327.6 2395.5   
    (1996) 
 
 
 
 123.30 45.55     AFDC      
(per recipient)   (1993) 
    124.42 45.41    
    (1994) 
    123.81 45.22    
    (1995) 
    122.86 44.28    
    (1996) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*Seven states either did not report separate figures specifying heterosexual 
AIDS contraction, or reported zero heterosexual AIDS cases for some or all 
years. These states are: Alaska (1994-96), Idaho (1996), Montana (1993-96), 
North Dakota (1993-96), South Dakota (1993-96),Vermont (1995-96), Wyoming 
(1993-96).   
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TABLE 2   
 
 
Descriptive Statistics for HIV, Estimated Heterosexual HIV: 1993-1996 
 
_________________________________________________________________    
  
    Mean   Standard 
      Deviation  
  
_________________________________________________________________ 
Estimated 
Heterosexual HIV*   59.04   83.90           
    (1993) 
    75.55   128.49         
    (1994) 
    64.94   79.28          
    (1995) 
    61.74   73.43          
    (1996) 
 
 
 
All HIV    574.69 621.77       
    (1993)  
    684.92 983.48     
    (1994) 
    505.96 515.64       
    (1995) 
    464.38 452.20       
    (1996) 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
*Twenty-six states reported HIV numbers for all four years: Alabama, Arizona, 
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, 
Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming.  
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TABLE 3   
2SLS Estimates 
(Corrected for Cross-sectional Heteroskedasticity) 
Dependent Variable is HET-HIV RATE 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
              Variable 
                           
cept                Inter
                afdc
              age 
e                colleg
              impop 
re                noinsu
              black 
              doctors 
              healthex 
              midatlan 
              souatlan 
              escentra 
              wscentra 
              encentra 
              wncentra 
              mountain 
              dummy94 
              dummy95 
              dummy96 
 
Parameter
Estimate
-0.02631
0.000080
-0.00019
-0.00028
0.002240
-0.00016
0.001594
0.000048
-7.98E-6
0.045832
0.020427
0.017309
0.016959
0.020701
0.018251
0.020671
0.001440
0.000340
0.000434
t Value
-3.10
3.90
-0.61
-2.25
3.54
-1.06
15.32
2.40
-5.85
6.05
8.07
5.10
5.54
6.34
7.96
6.45
2.25
0.46
0.51
Pr > |t|*
0.0026
0.0002
0.5460
0.0269
0.0007
0.2932
<.0001
0.0187
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.0273
0.6461
0.6131
__________________________________________________________________________ 
* denotes 2-tailed p-value.  If p < α, where α is level of test significance, 
then the null hypothesis that the parameter value is zero is rejected in favor 
of the alternative that it is not equal to zero. 
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APPENDIX 
 
The following are the 9 regions defined in the United States Census. We 
utilized 8 regions, since our 26-state sample did not include any states 
in the Pacific region.  The omitted category is New England. 
 
NEW ENGLAND: Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
Rhode Island. 
MIDDLE ATLANTIC: New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey.   
SOUTH ATLANTIC: West Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, District of Columbia. 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL: Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama. 
WEST SOUTH CENTRAL: Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Texas. 
EAST NORTH CENTRAL: Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio. 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL: North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
Iowa, Kansas, Missouri. 
MOUNTAIN: Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico, 
Nevada. 
PACIFIC: Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, Hawaii. 
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NOTES 
1 All figures in the Introduction are found on the CDC website:  
http://www.cdc.gov/. 
 
2 An exhaustive treatment of sexual behavior and its relation to costs and 
benefits can be found in Posner’s Sex and Reason (1992). 
 
3 In December 1999, the CDC issued guidelines recommending that all states 
adopt name-based HIV surveillance.  As of July 2001, 34 states have 
implemented name-based HIV case reporting to the CDC.      
 
4
  Due to the lack of a published state by state cost-of-living index, monetary 
variables are in nominal terms. 
 
5 Definitions of the regional dummies are contained in the Appendix. 
 
6  The test statistic is (NT)R
2 , (where NT = 104, the total number of 
observations) from the regression of the Two Stage Least Squares residuals e  
on the full set of instruments WX
ˆ
| Z = , and R
2 is the usual R-squared.  
Under the null hypothesis that the over-identifying instruments in W are 
uncorrelated with the regression error e, then ( ) ()
22
gm NT R − ≈χ
YW V =Π + | Z = ˆ
ˆ y X Y V error =β +γ +θ +
0 0 : H θ=
ˆ
() 1 m
, in large 
samples.   
 
7 The procedure is as follows: First estimate the reduced form equation 
, where WX , and obtain the reduced form residuals V . Then 
estimate the model   (*) by OLS.  OLS is consistent 
under the null hypothesis that Y is exogenous. For the null hypothesis 
 the Wald statistic is (SSER−SSEU ), where these are the restricted 
sum of squared errors (from the model (*) excluding V ) and the unrestricted 
sum of squared errors from (*), respectively. The dimension of θ is  ×  
where m = 2, and under the null hypothesis the Wald statistic is 
asymptotically  . 
2
() m χ
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ˆi
8 Notes are in order about this estimation procedure: (i) we use the 2SLS 
residuals so that even if the variables in Y are endogenous, our estimator σ  
is consistent; (ii) given the estimated weights, this is the procedure by the 
computer software SAS (V8.2) when PROC SYSLIN for 2SLS is invoked with the 
WEIGHT statement; (iii) it is true that the sample size T used in the 
calculation (3) is small. However, there is substantial evidence that when 
modeling heteroskedasticity, as long as the estimated variances indicate the 
general pattern of heteroskedasticity, then the resulting FGLS estimates (and 
presumably the weighted 2SLS estimates we use) are robust.  See, for example, 
Greene (1997, Chapter 12.6). 
 